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Elkhart argued that because
CERCLA speaks of "disposal," and
"disposal" includes accidental spill-
age, Detrex should be held account-
able for Transport Services' TCE
spillage. The Seventh Circuit decided
that in this particular context of a
product's transportation, "disposal"
excludes accidental spillage because
one does not arrange for an accident.
Therefore, CERCLA's words "ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment" refer to the
case where an individual desires to
dispose of hazardous waste and hires
a transportation company to carry the
waste to a disposal site.
In such a case, the shipper would
be a responsible person and liable for
cleanup costs. However, when the
shipper arranges for the delivery of a
useful hazardous product with a com-
mon carrier, it is not a responsible
person under CERCLA if spillage
occurs en route. Hence, under
CERCLA, Detrex was only liable for
the spillage of TCE from its own
trucks, and not from the trucks of
Transport Services. :.
- Benjamin Malkin
Cryptic Exclusion
Endorsements on
Automobile Insurance
Policies Are Enforceable
In Dungey v. Haines & Britton,
Ltd., 614 N.E.2d 1205, (Ill. 1993), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a re-
newed insurance policy assumes the
conditions of the original contract.
Therefore, a previous exclusion en-
dorsement becomes part of a renewed
contract. In reversing the court of
appeals, the supreme court affirmed
the circuit court's judgment that a re-
newed policy was unambiguous, and a
driver named in an initial exclusion
endorsement was excluded from cov-
erage under a renewed insurance
policy.
Appellate Court Finds
Exclusionary Clause Ambiguous
In 1981, John and Shirley Dungey
obtained automobile insurance cover-
age through Haines & Britton, Ltd.
(Haines), an insurance broker. The
Economy Fire and Casualty Company
(Economy) issued Shirley Dungey an
insurance policy for a 1980 Plymouth
Horizon she owned with her husband.
As part of the policy, Shirley Dungey
signed a statement, called a "named
drivers exclusion endorsement,"
which excluded her husband, John
Dungey, from coverage due to his
poor driving record. At the bottom of
the endorsement, appeared the nota-
tion "CE-180."
One year later, when Shirley
Dungey renewed her insurance policy,
she again signed a named drivers ex-
clusion endorsement excluding John
Dungey from coverage. The notation
"CE-303" appeared at the bottom of
this second endorsement. Shirley
Dungey subsequently renewed the
auto insurance policy on the Plymouth
Horizon many times. Yet, Economy
never again asked her to sign a named
driver exclusion endorsement. In-
stead, she received a declaration state-
ment from Economy each time she
renewed her policy. The declaration
statement contained a preprinted line
entitled "Endorsement(s)," after which
were a series of numbers, including
"CE-303." This number correlated
with the second named drivers exclu-
sion attached to the original policy
which Shirley Dungey signed to indi-
cate that John Dungey was excluded
from insurance coverage.
In 1983, the Dungeys obtained a
second policy from Economy. Shirley
Dungey's son was listed as the pri-
mary driver on this policy. Moreover,
two cars previously insured under the
first policy, although at different times,
were insured under this second policy.
The premiums were higher and the
policy periods shorter on this policy
than on the first policy. No endorse-
ment excluding John Dungey was re-
quired under this policy and the decla-
ration statements sent to Shirley upon
renewal of this policy did not contain
the notation "CE-303."
In 1985, the Dungeys purchased a
1985 Chevrolet Sportsvan. Although
Shirley recalled telling her insurance
broker that John would be the primary
driver, the insurance company ex-
cluded her husband from the policy
because the van was added to the origi-
nal 1981 policy.
On the same day the Dungeys added
the Chevrolet van to the first policy,
they obtained a third policy from
Economy for a 1984 Chrysler Laser
which had previously been insured
under Shirley's first policy. Both John
and Shirley were listed as drivers on
this policy that also had higher premi-
ums and shorter periods than the first
policy.
On March 29, 1986, while John
Dungey was driving the 1985 van in-
sured under the first policy, he had an
accident. The van was destroyed and
John was injured. Economy denied
the Dungeys' claim for coverage be-
cause Economy claimed the first
policy excluded John Dungey from
coverage.
The Dungeys filed a lawsuit to re-
cover damages for breach of contract
and negligence against both Haines
and Economy. The plaintiffs and
Economy filed motions for summary
judgment. The trial judge granted
Economy's motion for summaryjudg-
ment, finding as a matter of law that
the named drivers exclusion contained
in the policy excluded coverage and
was unambiguous. The trial court
also found that Haines was not an
agent of Economy and that Economy
would not be liable for Haines.
The plaintiffs appealed the trial
court's decision. The appellate court,
with one justice dissenting, reversed
the trial court's judgment. The appel-
late court held that the exclusionary
clause was ambiguous and that there
was a genuine issue of material fact
concerning the intent of the parties as
to the exclusion clause. Economy
filed a petition for leave to appeal,
which the Illinois Supreme Court
granted.
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Plaintiffs Claim Exclusion
Endorsement Language and
Defendant's Actions Were
Ambiguous
The plaintiffs argued that Shirley
Dungey's first policy, which eventu-
ally covered the van involved in the
accident, was ambiguous and should
be construed strictly against Economy.
The Dungeys asserted that the nota-
tion "CE-303" did not explicitly state
that John Dungey was excluded from
coverage and, at best, had to be inter-
preted by reference to the original
policy. The plaintiffs also contended
that Economy's actions augmented the
policy's ambiguity when they insured
John Dungey as the driver of another
car under a separate policy. Further-
more, after Shirley signed the drivers
exclusion endorsement pertaining to
the first policy on two separate occa-
sions, she was not asked to sign the
endorsement again. Thus, a reason-
able inference existed that John was
covered to drive the 1985 van. None-
theless, Economy argued that the en-
dorsement notation "CE-303" clearly
and unambiguously excluded John
Dungey from coverage and insisted
that the renewed contract must be ap-
plied as written.
Ambiguity Claim Unfounded
The Illinois Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment of the court of
appeals, holding that the exclusionary
clause was unambiguous and that the
intent of the parties was clear. The
court referred to its decision in
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Pearce, 399 N.E.2d 151 (Ill. 1979),
where it recognized that as a general
rule, when a policy renewal is made,
the original endorsement becomes part
of the renewed contract of insurance.
In the instant case, the court deter-
mined that since the notation "CE-
303" appeared on the renewed poli-
cies with the word "Endorsement(s),"
it was sufficient to convey to the plain-
tiffs that the notation referred to the
policy's endorsement, even though
reference was made to the exclusion
clause by two different numbers: "CE-
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180" in the original policy and "CE-
303" in subsequent renewals. The
court held that the policy could be
construed in only one way: that John
Dungey was excluded from coverage
under his wife's first policy.
The court also rejected the plain-
tiffs' second claim that Economy's
actions were a source of ambiguity.
To determine whether ambiguity ex-
ists in an insurance contract, the court
should consider the subject matter of
the contract, the facts surrounding its
execution, the situation of the parties,
and the predominate purpose of the
contract, which is to indemnify the
insured. The court determined that
since Shirley Dungey signed exclu-
sion endorsement "CE-180" on the
original policy, exclusion form "CE-
303" at the time of first renewal, and
that each subsequent renewal referred
to endorsement "CE-303," she should
have reasonably believed that her hus-
band was excluded from coverage.
Finally, the court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claim that the original exclusion
endorsement was no longer in effect.
The court found that the Dungeys'
belief that Economy no longer had
reservations about covering John was
misguided, since the other policies
the family purchased from Economy
had higher premiums and shorter cov-
erage periods. Thus, the court ruled
that the factual circumstances did not
render the Dungeys' policy on their
van ambiguous, and the plaintiffs were
correctly denied coverage.
Dissent Argues Holding
Contravenes Principles of Law
Applicable to Insurance Contracts
In his dissent, Justice Bilandic
maintained that the majority's deci-
sion contravened accepted principles
of law governing the construction of
insurance policies. In construing an
insurance contract, the primary pur-
pose is to give effect to the intentions
of the parties as expressed in the con-
tract. When an insurance policy con-
tains ambiguous terms, it must be con-
strued most strongly against the in-
surer who prepared the contract.
Bilandic found that the factual cir-
cumstances surrounding the renewal
of the Dungeys' policy in 1982 dem-
onstrated that the parties did not in-
tend for the original exclusion en-
dorsement, which Shirley executed in
1981, to become part of the renewal
contract in 1982. Instead, he argued
that because Economy specifically
required Shirley to execute a new en-
dorsement, the terms of the original
policy did not become part of the re-
newal contract of insurance. Thus,
according to Bilandic, the general rule
on which the majority relied - that
upon policy renewal, the terms of the
original policy become part of the
renewed contract unless indicated oth-
erwise - was not applicable to the
Dungeys' situation.
The justice further asserted that the
key inquiry in construing policy cov-
erage is not what the drafters actually
intended, but whether they expressed
their alleged intent in the language of
the policy itself, so that the insured
understood the policy's terms. The
rule that insurers should gain no ad-
vantage from their own drafting am-
biguities should be applied rigorously.
In this case, Bilandic insisted that
ambiguity existed as to whether the
parties intended to make the second
exclusion endorsement part of the in-
surance contract during subsequent
renewal periods. Also, since the note
"Endorsements" followed by "CE-
303" was not defined in the original
policy or the declaration sheet, it
should be afforded its plain, ordinary,
and popular meaning. In Bilandic's
opinion, the cryptic hieroglyphics
"CE-303" could not have been under-
stood by the average insurance con-
sumer. Although Economy knew what
the symbol meant, it failed to provide
the Dungeys with any means of deci-
phering the code.
Bilandic concluded that the
majority's holding contravenes the
long-standing judicial policy favor-
ing a liberal interpretation of insur-
ance coverage. He urged the court to
require insurance companies to en-
close a brief description of the nature
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of endorsements when a person re-
news an insurance policy. -:-
- Mona E. Dajani
New Jersey Real Estate
Brokers Have a Duty to
Inspect and Warn
In Hopkins v. Fox & Lago Real-
tors, 625 A.2d 1110 (N.J. 1993), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that a real estate broker conducting an
open house has a duty to inspect the
premises if given the opportunity. The
real estate broker must then warn pro-
spective buyers and visitors of any
dangerous conditions that are reason-
ably discoverable through an ordi-
nary inspection.
Camouflaged Step
On April 26, 1987, plaintiff, Emily
Hopkins, accompanied her son and
daughter-in-law to an open house con-
ducted by a real estate broker em-
ployed by defendant, Fox & Lago
Realtors. The realtor met the Hopkins
party and permitted them to inspect
the premises on their own. While her
son and daughter-in-law toured the
home's patio and grounds, Hopkins
waited in the family room. Upon
hearing the others re-enter the home
through the foyer, Hopkins attempted
to join them. She proceeded down the
hallway towards the foyer, but did not
see that a step led down from the
hallway into the foyer. Consequently,
Hopkins stumbled and fell, fracturing
her ankle. She brought suit against
the broker, claiming that the use of the
same vinyl flooring on both levels
camouflaged the step and that the bro-
ker had a legal duty to warn her of any
known risks or risks that a reasonable
inspection would have revealed.
The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint, concluding that
the broker did not owe her any duty
with respect to the dangerous condi-
tion of the property. On appeal, how-
ever, the appellate court determined
that such a duty existed and reversed
the trial court.
The appellate court agreed with the
plaintiff's contentions that an open
house visitor resembled an invitee or
a business guest of the defendant.
Moreover, the court concluded that
the defendant broker was, in effect, a
functional occupier of the premises.
Having analogized the position of the
broker to that of a proprietor of the
home, the appellate court applied the
common law principle of premises
liability. Premises liability imposes
on the landowner a duty of reasonable
care to guard against any discoverable
dangerous conditions on her property
for the protection of her business
invitees.
The defendant broker appealed,
claiming that because a real estate
broker is not the actual owner or occu-
pier of the premises, but merely an
agent of the homeowner, the broker
does not owe a duty to inspect the
premises and warn invitees of any
dangerous conditions.
Supreme Court Finds Duty to
Inspect and Warn
The Supreme Court of New Jersey
upheld the appellate court's decision,
reversing the trial court's dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint and remanding
the matter for trial. In reaching its
decision, however, the court refused
to follow the appellate court's strict
application of the traditional common
law doctrine governing premises li-
ability. Rather, the court traced the
history of premises liability law, ar-
guing that as modern society has de-
veloped, so has the legal relationship
of people to property. As a result, the
court found that the rigid constructs
of traditional common law premises
liability could not adequately accom-
modate the legal relationship that ex-
ists between a broker and an open-
house visitor. Since any attempt to
classify the parties into the traditional
common law categories would be
strained and awkward, the court pre-
ferred a more flexible approach to
premises liability law.
The supreme court found that the
best way to determine whether a duty
existed was an inquiry into the fair-
ness and justice of imposing such a
duty in light of the actual relationship
between the parties. This inquiry in-
volved identifying and weighing sev-
eral factors, including "the relation-
ship of the parties, the nature of the
attendant risk, the opportunity and the
ability to exercise care, and the public
interest in the proposed solution."
The court noted that the broker was
authorized to invite visitors and offer
various professional services, includ-
ing his expertise with regard to the
marketability of the premises and the
physical features that affect market-
ability. Therefore, the court found
that implicit in the offering of such
services was the broker's familiarity
with the premises on which an open-
house visitor could reasonably rely.
Furthermore, the court found that the
broker received tangible economic
benefits from this relationship, includ-
ing the opportunity to earn commis-
sions and cultivate future clients.
Based on these findings, the court
concluded that the broker's invitation
to potential customers implied a com-
mensurate degree of responsibility for
the visitors' safety.
The defendant broker argued that
imposing a duty on brokers was unfair
because the homeowner is in the best
position to guard against unreason-
able dangers. The court agreed with
the defendant's contention that
homeowners have a pre-existing,
nondelegable duty to guard against
any reasonably discoverable defects.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that
a homeowner's pre-existing duty to
prevent any foreseeable harm to
invitees did not in any way affect the
broker's own duty because two par-
ties can possess similar duties with
respect to a third party. In defining
the scope of this newly created duty,
the court ruled that the relevant ques-
tions include: what risks to others a
reasonably prudent real estate broker
conducting an open house would fore-
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